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Evidence from Asia and 
the OECD 
John F.  Helliwell 
Attempts to estimate models of  comparative growth applicable to all of  the 
world’s economies have found the Asian experience to be different in key re- 
spects from that of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) countries. The faster-growing Asian economies have typically 
relied on an outward-looking trading strategy and have rapidly adopted, and 
sometimes leapfrogged, technical advances developed and originally applied 
in other countries. This paper seeks to link these two issues, by first assessing 
the extent to which comparative growth models fitted to global and OECD 
evidence apply to the Asian experience, and then seeing if differing openness 
among the Asian economies helps to explain their relative growth rates. 
The evidence will be presented in stages. The first section will supply some 
background and results from a model of  comparative growth applied to  a 
global sample of countries, with special attention to the extent to which conver- 
gence of  growth rates is apparent once due allowance is made for differing 
rates of accumulation of  physical and human capital and for differences in 
average scale. Then the focus will turn to the same model fitted to the industrial 
countries and to a step-by-step assessment of the reasons why, and extent to 
which, the model does not explain the comparative growth performance of the 
Asian economies. This will be followed by  some tests of  the contribution of 
other factors to explaining the Asian growth experience, with special attention 
to the extent to which the Asian countries are economically and politically 
open to the rest of the world. 
Evidence on these issues is of interest far beyond the boundaries of the coun- 
tries concerned, since more than half of the world’s population lives in Asia, 
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and what happens in the Asian economies is bound to become ever more im- 
portant at the global level. This growing importance is due in part to growing 
international  interdependence, whether measured by trade shares or by  the 
shrinking relative costs of transport and communications, and in part to the 
fact that  average growth  rates  in Asia  are likely to remain  above those  in 
the rest of the world for decades to come. 
1.1  Background and Global Evidence 
The initial results reported in this paper are drawn from cross-sectional esti- 
mates of a comparative growth model fitted to explain the growth of GDP per 
adult in 98 countries between 1960 and 1985.’ The particular equation used is 
based on an extended form of the Solow (1956, 1957) growth model, as aug- 
mented by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil(1992) to include human capital accumu- 
lation, with real output determined as a Cobb-Douglas function of  physical 
capital, human capital, and efficiency units of labor: 
Y(t) =  K(t)“H(t)P(A(t)L(f))l~*-P, 
where H is the stock of human capital, L the stock of labor (growing at rate n), 
K the stock of physical capital, depreciating at the rate 6, and A the level of 
technology, growing at the constant rate g. The coefficients  imply constant 
returns to all factors taken together, and hence diminishing returns to any com- 
bination of physical and human capital. If sk  is the fraction of output invested 
in physical capital and sh the fraction invested in human capital, then in the 
steady state the log of output per capita is 
(2)  ln(Y(t)/L(t)) = lnA(0) + gt -  ((a  + p)/(1 -  a -  P))ln(n + g + 6) 
+ (a/(  1 -  a -  p))ln(s,) + (p/(  1 -  a -  P))ln(s,). 
This framework is extended to include the possibility of what Mankiw et al. 
call “conditional convergence,” that if each country starts at some level of out- 
put that differs from its steady-state value, there will be convergence toward 
the steady-state growth path for that country. This need not imply that all coun- 
tries have the same equilibrium level of  income per capita (they argue that 
the level of A can be different across countries, based on variations in natural 
resources, institutions, and other factors unrelated to the stocks of human and 
physical capital) or even the same growth rate, since the equilibrium growth 
rate for each country will depend on its population growth and investment in 
human and physical capital. The Solow model augmented for human capital 
accumulation predicts that the rate of convergence of each country toward its 
steady-state growth path will be at the proportional rate A, where 
(3)  A =  (n + g + 6)(1 -  -  p). 
1.  The real GDP data are from the Mark  IV data sample described in Summers and Heston 
(1988), as augmented and implemented by Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil (1992). 9  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
The log difference between current income per effective worker and that in 
any given earlier period 0 is thus given by 
(4)  ln(y(t)j -  ln(y(0)) = (1 -  e-")(a/l  -  a -  P))ln(s,) 
+ (1 -  e-"')(P/(l -  a -  p))ln(s,) -  (1 -  e-*I) 
((a  + p)/(I -  a -  p))ln(n + g + S) 
-  (1 -  e-")In(y(O)). 
Applied by Mankiw et al. to a cross-sectional sample of the growth experi- 
ence of 98 countries from 1960 to 1985, this equation seemed to fit the experi- 
ence of the developing as well as the industrial countries. There was evidence 
of conditional convergence for the whole sample of countries, as well as for 
the more restricted sample of industrial countries. Their results also showed 
that allowing for the accumulation  of human capital lowered the estimated 
coefficient on physical capital to a level that was consistent with capital's share 
in output, and hence with the Cobb-Douglas assumption of constant returns to 
scale. Mankiw et al. interpreted their results as a vindication of the augmented 
Solow model and an implicit rejection  of  the increasing number of  models 
built on the assumption that knowledge spillovers created the likelihood of 
increasing returns to scale at the national level.* In the light of earlier results 
finding some significant evidence of modest returns to average scale at the 
national level,, the equations used in this paper augment equation (4) to in- 
clude scale effects and also impose the coefficient restrictions implied by equa- 
tion (4), so that the final form for estimation using cross-sectional data for 
growth in GDP per adult between 1960 and 1985 is 
(5)  ln(GDPa85) -  ln(GDPa60) = a, + a,ln(scale) + a21n(GDPa60j 
+ a,(ln(invest) -  ln(n + g + Sj) 
+ a,(ln(school) -  ln(n + g  + S)), 
where a, =-(1  -  ePZsj, 
a, = (1 -  e-A2s(a/(l  -  a -  p)), 
a4 =  (I -  e-yp/(i -  a -  p)). 
In the Mankiw et al. framework, the productivity index may have a different 
level in each country (to account for resource endowments, etc.), but has the 
same exogenous growth rate in each country. This may be contrasted with an 
alternative that I have previously developed and tested with the collaboration 
2. For examples, see Romer (1986, 1990a, 1990b)  and Lucas (1988, 1990). Alternative endoge- 
nous growth models by Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1990a, 1990b) assume economies of scale 
and knowledge spillovers at the industry level, which has no necessary implications for returns to 
scale at the national level. See Helpman (1991) for a helpful survey. 
3. The evidence for increasing returns is based entirely on the experience of the industrial coun- 
tries. Increasing the sample to include 98 countries does not overturn the result, but neither does 
it provide any evidence for returns to scale. Tests for nonlinearity in the scale effect (reported in 
Helliwell and Chung 1991c) did not find any apparent threshold effects. 10  John F.  Helliwell 
of Alan Ch~ng,~  in which the efficiency indexes initially grow at different rates 
in each country, with convergence taking place in the rates of growth, and pos- 
sibly in the levels, of the technology indexes. In this alternative, international 
transfers of  knowledge are given a central role in convergence, with the ini- 
tially poorer countries able to have efficiency levels that grow faster than those 
in the richer countries. This is because the initially poorer countries are able to 
make use of current best practice procedures already in use in the more produc- 
tive economies. If a large part of convergence takes place through this channel, 
rather than just by different investment rates and general use of the same tech- 
nologies, then it offers strong support for models, such as those of Grossman 
and Helpman (1991), that treat technology transfer as a costly and time-using 
process that depends on market structure and relative levels of  income and 
education. It also implies that at least part of the convergence may take place 
without high levels of investment, although it leaves unspecified the conditions 
that best facilitate international transmission of technical progress. This issue 
will be the focus of a later section. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that 
studies of the OECD economies have shown strong convergence in the rates of 
growth of “Solow residuals,” even after allowing for differences in the rates of 
investment in human ~apital.~  These results force the adoption of a different 
interpretation of the constant term in cross-sectional growth regressions. In the 
Mankiw et al. framework, the estimated constant term is just the logarithm 
of the ratio of equilibrium incomes. If  convergence of productivity growth is 
assumed, the estimated constant term in a cross-sectional regression is a func- 
tion of the equilibrium-level differences, as well as the speed of convergence, 
of growth rates and the initial level-differences of the productivity indexes. 
Figure  1.1 shows the conditional convergence  for the  98-country global 
sample. The curve shows the predicted growth rate6 for any country as a func- 
tion of its 1960 real GDP per capita, assuming the country to have global aver- 
age values for all of the other variables in equation (i) of table 1.1. The two- 
letter country codes used in the figures are defined in appendix A. The vertical 
distance between each country’s rectangle and the curve is that country’s error 
term in the cross-country regression and, hence, shows the extent to which the 
4. In Helliwell, Sturm, and  Salou (1985) and  Helliwell and Chung  (1991b) for the G-7, in 
Helliwell and Chung (1991a) for 19 industrial counties, and in Helliwell and Chung (1992~)  for 19 
industrial and 8 Asian economies. The effects of adding variations to human capital are assessed in 
Helliwell and Chung (1992a). 
5.  The Solow residuals are obtained by inverting equation (1)  to define a measured series for 
A(r) using actual values for Y and K, and using the number of employees to represent the labor 
input HL. Tests supporting convergence of the rates of growth of the Solow residuals for the OECD 
countries are reported in Helliwell and Chung (1991a) and Helliwell (1992b). 
6. The predicted values in the figures are presented as average annual proportionate growth 
rates, obtained by dividing by  25 the estimated growth rates from the equations reported in table 
1.1, which estimate the results for growth over a 25-year period. Figure 1.1 is based on the parame- 
ter estimates from the global equation (i). while figures 1.2-1.6  are based on the OECD equa- 
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Fig. 1.1 
Nofe: All country codes in these and the other figures in this chapter are explained in appendix 
A, with the following exceptions: AR = Argentina; BOT = Botswana; VE = Venezuela; ZAM 
= Zambia. 
Conditional convergence in the global economy 
global model fits that country’s experience. If  separate dummy variables are 
added for continents, growth rates are found to be lower in Africa and South 
America. There is no significant difference for average growth in Asia, but the 
model nonetheless does a poor job of explaining the growth experiences of the 
Asian economies, as can be seen by the rectangles for some of the Asian coun- 
tries. The model fails to capture either the high growth of Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Korea, or the low growth of India and Sri Lanka. To delve further 
into this, we turn to consider the model’s predictions for each of the key factors 
it uses to explain growth differences. This will be done using parameter esti- 
mates for the OECD countries, which do not differ dramatically from those in 
the  global  sample and permit  a  closer  inspection  of  actual  and  predicted 
growth rates for each of the Asian and OECD countries. 
1.2  Comparing Growth in Asia and the OECD 
Figure 1.2 is somewhat akin to figure 1.1, in that growth is on the vertical 
axis and initial real GDP is on the horizontal axis. There are three key differ- 
ences. Here the rectangles show each country’s actual average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per adult over the 1960-85  period, while the plus signs verti- 
cally above or below each rectangle show what that country’s growth rate is 12  John F. Helliwell 
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Source: Series for NTB, BLACK, and TARIFF from World Bank (1991). 
Notes:  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable in all equations is 
the growth in real GDP per adult from 1960 to 1985, i.e., In(GDPa85) -  ln(GDPa60). 
NTB is the total number of  nontariff barriers; BLACK the average percentage black market ex- 
change premium, 197 1-85;  and TARIFF total tariff revenues, as a percentage of total imports, average 
over 197  1-85. 
predicted to be, using the parameters based on OECD data7  and each country’s 
own actual values for each of the model variables.8 
The distance by which the rectangle is above the plus sign is thus the equa- 
tion error for that country? The curve in figure 1.2 shows the predicted growth 
rate for any country that has the initial income recorded on the horizontal axis 
and average values for the other variables in equation (ii) of  table  1.1. The 
distance between the curve and the plus sign for each country shows how much 
of its growth is explained by that country’s differences from average values for 
7. The parameter estimates are shown in equation (ii) of table 1.1. 
8. For all of the results reported in this paper, Japan is treated as part of the OECD sample, since 
it is a member of  the OECD and since the OECD model fits the Japanese experience closely 
enough that the parameter estimates do not depend materially on whether Japan is included. 
9. The distance between the rectangle and the plus sign in figure 1.2 is thus analogous to the 
distance between the rectangles and the curve in figure 1.1, but is not exactly the same because in 
figure 1  .I the parameters are based on the global sample while the OECD sample is used to esti- 
mate the equation used to define the predicted values in figure 1.2. 13  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
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Fig. 1.2  Actual and predicted growth versus 1960 income per adult: OECD 
and Asia 
Note: See note for fig  1.1. 
Q 
investment rates, schooling, population growth, and scale. The rectangles for 
the Asian economies, with the exception of  Korea, are far from the curve. In 
some cases, such as that of Japan, most of  the distance is explained by the 
model, while in others, especially Singapore and Hong Kong, the error of the 
model is even larger than the distance between the curve and the actual growth 
performance. According to the model, these two economies should have had 
much lower growth rates, given their relatively high initial incomes (relative to 
those in most non-OECD countries) and very small size, even given their rela- 
tively high investment rates. In fact, there is no evidence of convergence among 
the Asian economies, with the three richest-Japan,  Hong Kong, and Singa- 
pore-having  the fastest subsequent growth rates, while the two slowest grow- 
ing-India  and Nepal-among  those with the lowest initial income levels. 
Direct estimation of the comparative growth model for Asia, as shown in equa- 
tion (iii) of table l.  l, shows (insignificant) diseconomies of scale, (insignifi- 
cant) divergence rather than convergence, a significant investment effect with 
twice the coefficient estimated for either the global or the OECD samples, and 
an insignificant negative effect of schooling. 
Figures 1.3-1.5  investigate the model results more closely by plotting three 
of  the model's other key partial relationships to show some of the important 
differences between the Asian and the OECD economies, and among the Asian 
economies themselves. In all three figures, the curves are drawn using the pa- 
rameters estimated for the OECD countries. Figure  1.3 shows growth rates 14  John F. Helliwell 
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Fig. 1.3  Actual and predicted growth versus investment as percentage of GDP: 
in OECD and Asia 
Note:  See note for fig. 1.1. 
plotted against investment rates and demonstrates why the investment effect is 
seen to be so high for the Asian sample on its own (as shown by eq. [iii] in 
table l.l), with especially high investment in the faster-growing countries and 
abnormally low investment in the slow growers. Of course, simultaneous equa- 
tions bias is likely to be a serious problem in this case, as growth encouraged 
by  other factors would  imply higher investment  rates  in the faster-growing 
countries to keep the ratios of capital to labor at their cost-minimizing levels. 
Figure 1.4 shows the relation between schooling and growth. As shown by 
the flat curve, the estimated relation is weak for the OECD countries, while 
equation (iii) in table  1.1 shows that it is even negative for the Asian econo- 
mies. The variable is significant in the global sample, as shown by equation (i) 
in table 1.1, because of educational differences among the African countries, 
and to a lesser extent among the Latin American countries. In Asia, the relation 
is upset both by the high-growth countries with low schooling rates (Pakistan, 
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand) and the slow-growing countries  with high 
schooling ratios  (Sri Lanka and the Philippines). To  test whether this result 
was dependent on the use of a particular measure of  educational attainment, 
three alternative variables were also assessed, including the adult literacy rate, 
the average years of education in the labor force, and estimated years of educa- 
tion of the population of working age.'O The simple correlations of these three 
10. All three of the alternative series are drawn from World Bank (1991), with values equal to 
the average of  the reported observations over the 1960-85  estimation period. The values used are 
recorded in appendixes. 15  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
variables with each other, and with the secondary schooling variable used in 
the initial regressions, lie between  .8 and .9. Each of these three alternative 
variables attracts an insignificant negative coefficient if used to replace the 
schooling variable in equation (iii) of table 1.1. Thus the insignificant negative 
coefficient on schooling in the Asian equation (iii) in table 1.1 is not simply a 
result of the use of a peculiar measure of educational attainment, leaving open 
the  question  of  why  measures  of  educational  attainment  have  less  cross- 
sectional explanatory  power in Asia  than elsewhere among the developing 
countries. 
Figure 1.5 shows the relation between scale and growth, which is significant 
but of modest size for the OECD (degree of  returns to scale at the national 
level of 1.06  1) and of the reverse sign for the Asian economies, chiefly because 
of the influence of small but fast-growing Singapore and Hong Kong and of 
large but slow-growing India. 
Finally, before turning to some attempts to assess the effect of economic 
openness on relative growth differences among the Asian economies, figure 
1.6 shows the relation between growth rates and a measure of political democ- 
racy in 1960. Attempts to unravel the complex linkages between political open- 
ness and economic growth have generally shown a strong positive relation be- 
tween a country's level of per capita income and current and subsequent values 
of several different measures of democracy, including indexes of civil liberties 
as well as political rights. As for the reverse linkages from democracy to subse- 
quent economic growth, they have proved difficult to measure, in part because 
of the shortage of data to enable the simultaneous feedbacks from income to 
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Fig. 1.4  Actual and predicted growth versus secondary school enrollment: 
OECD and Asia 
Note: See note for fig. 1.1. 
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democracy to be disentangled from the effects of  democracy on economic 
growth.'' When simultaneous feedbacks are accounted for, as they are by the 
use of Bollen's  (1980, 1990) index of democracy for 1960, the results tend to 
show a generally negative but  very  slight effect  on  subsequent economic 
growth, for given levels of investment and education. When the positive effects 
of  democracy on education and investment are taken into account, however, 
the net effect seems to be about zero for the global sample.I2  Simple correla- 
tions between the Bollen index and growth, for both the OECD and Asian 
samples, tend to confirm this result, as does visual inspection of the data shown 
in figure 1.6. More direct attempts to make use of  the Bollen index in ex- 
plaining growth differences among the Asian economies will be found in the 
next section and in the equations reported in table 1.2. 
DNZ  at  2130  billion 19809 
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1.3  Explaining Growth Differences among the Asian Economies 
As noted in the introduction, many of the faster-growing Asian economies 
have relied heavily on an outward-looking strategy. This section draws together 
some  measures  of  openness collected and  distributed by  the World  Bank 
(1991) in the course of research for the bank's  1991 World Development Re- 
port. The results reported can only be suggestive rather than conclusive, since 
11. The substantial but inconclusive empirical  literature is surveyed by  Sirowy and Inkeles 
12. These results are reported in Helliwell (1992a). 
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Fig. 1.6  Actual and predicted growth versus 1960 Bollen index of democracy: 
OECD and Asia 
Note: See note for fig. 1.1. 
the size of the sample is small and only three measures of economic openness 
have been assessed. However, as shown by  figures 1.7-1.9,  and in equations 
(iv)-(vi)  of table 1.1, there is a significant relation between each of the mea- 
sures of  openness and economic growth for the sample of  11 countries for 
which both types of data are a~ai1able.l~ 
The first of the three measures is the frequency of nontariff barriers (NTBs) 
applied to all goods, with the total for each country based on total world im- 
ports of the  product^.'^ The regression explains about 40 percent of the cross- 
sectional variation in growth rates, although the risk of simultaneous equations 
bias may be serious with an independent variable measured four-fifths of the 
way  through the growth period under review, since countries that succeed in 
growing quickly for some other reasons may  thereafter choose to liberalize 
their trade. However, figure 1.7 shows that the countries are divided into two 
distinct groups, with the faster-growing countries generally having fewer non- 
tariff barriers not just in 1981 but over the preceding years as well. 
The second measure of  openness is the black market exchange premium, 
which presumably relates to the mobility of  capital at least as much  as of 
goods, and is averaged over the period 1971-85,  the longest period for which 
13. The sample is reduced from 13 to  11 because the measures of  openness are not available 
14. The series used here is NTBWS, measured as of 1981, based on UNCTAD (1987) primary 
for Burma and Nepal. The data used are shown in appendix B. 
data and made available and described in World Bank (1991). 18  John F. Helliwell 
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Source: Series for NTB, BLACK, and TARIFF from World Bank (1991). 
Nofes:  Absolute values of  f-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable in all equations 
is the growth in real GDP per adult from 1960 to 1985, i.e., In(GDPa85) -  In(GDPa60). 
NTB is the total number of nontariff barriers; BLACK the average percentage black market 
exchange premium,  1971-85;  and TARIFF total tariff revenues as a percentage of total imports, 
average over 197 1-85. 
The nine countries for which the tariff data and the 1960 Bollen democracy index (from Bollen 
[1980, app. 21) are both available include India (.936), Indonesia (.203), Korea (.517), Malaysia 
(.835), Pakistan  (.400), Philippines  (.930), Singapore  (.812),  Sri Lanka  (.940), and Thailand 
(.331); the 1960 values for the Bollen index are shown in parentheses after each country name. 
data are available for all 11 c~untries.'~  It also has a significant correlation with 
cross-sectional differences in growth rates, with a 1 percentage point increase 
in the average black market premium being associated with a .06 percentage 
point decrease in the average annual growth rate over the 1960-85 period.I6  Of 
the three measures, it contributes the least to explaining differences in growth 
rates, with one-third of the variance being explained. 
The third openness variable is total import duty collected, measured as a 
percentage of  total merchandise imports, averaged over the 1971-85  period. 
This variable is transformed for estimation, as shown in table 1.1. It has the 
highest explanatory power of the three variables, with almost half of the cross- 
sectional variance of growth rates explained by differences in tariff rates. The 
15. The data are from the World Currency  Yearbook and are included in World Bank (1991) 
16. To calculate the effect, the coefficient must be divided by 25, since the dependent variable 
under the series title BLACK. 
is the 25-year log difference in real GDP per adult. 19  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
2 
3 





73  .- 













oBA  UPH 
olA  .. . 
0.01 I 
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  1 
Average Number of  Non-Tariff Barriers 
Fig. 1.7  Actual and predicted growth versus number of nontariff barriers 
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estimated size of the effect is such that a 1 percentage point increase in average 
tariffs is associated with a .17 percent decrease in the average annual growth 
rate. 
To what extent are the three openness variables providing independent infor- 
mation? Their correlations with one another are relatively low, which may be 
due in part to different errors of measurement and in part to the fact that differ- 
ent countries have adopted different types of  trade and capital restriction~.'~ 
The first equation of table 1.2 attempts to exploit the independent variance in 
the three measures by including them all in a single equation. Given the small 
size of  the sample and the fact that all three variables are measuring closely 
related policies, it is not surprising that the significance levels of the individual 
variables is much reduced. However, the adjusted proportion of  the variance 
explained nonetheless rises to .58, with tariffs and the black market premium 
being the most important contributors. Equation (ii) adds the investment rate, 
which was the only one of the original growth model variables to be significant 
in the Asian estimation for 13 countries. Adding the investment variable has 
the effect of  leaving the overall proportion of variance explained slightly re- 
duced and lowers the effect of the NTBs and the black market exchange pre- 
mium almost to zero. Removing the latter two variables raises the adjusted R2 
to .68, as shown in equation (iii). 
17. For the 11-country sample, the correlations are .37 between the tariff and the black market 
premium variables, .67 between the tariff and NTB variables, and  .41 between the black market 
premium and NTB variables. 21  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
Equations (iv)-(vi) estimate the partial effect of democracy given either in- 
vestment rates or tariff measures, or both, as basic explanatory variables. When 
investment rates and the democracy index are both included in the equation, 
the adjusted R2  rises to about .89 and is slightly higher when the tariff rate is 
also included in the equation. The partial effect of democracy is found to be 
negative, with a coefficient three times as large and more than twice as signifi- 
cant as was earlier found when the Bollen index was added to the global equa- 
tion.I8 This strong and striking result raises at least two questions of reliability 
and interpretation. First, the sample size is so small that the result may  be 
heavily dependent on the particularities of one or two countries and on ad hoc 
choices of  functional form and variables. Second, there is a real possibility 
that although democracy may have a negative partial effect given the level of 
investment, investment rates themselves may be higher in a democratic system. 
This latter possibility, which was significant for the global sample, turns out 
not to be important in the Asian sample, where no significant part of the cross- 
country variation in investment rates was explained by differences in their 1960 
indexes of  democracy. Huntington (1991) argues, from the evidence of  the 
successive waves of democratization in the twentieth century, that first attempts 
often fail, in part because of the lack of previous experience in the successful 
management of democratic institutions. Asian countries that were in their early 
stages of democracy, or whose first attempts failed during the data period under 
study, may well show stronger negative correlations with growth than would 
be true for the global sample including many countries with more decades of 
successful operation of democracies. In addition, of course, there is the possi- 
bility that for some of the countries studied, the conditions were met for the 
“conflict perspective” (Huntington 1987; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) to be appli- 
cable, with fledgling democratic institutions being too weak to adopt the poli- 
cies necessary to foster sustained economic growth. 
There is, however, one relationship that is common to the OECD and the 
Asian economies that is not shared by the other regional groupings of coun- 
tries. That is the linkage between the real exchange rate and the average level 
of per capita GDP, as shown in figure 1.10 for 1985. The relationship holds 
quite strongly among the OECD economies (Hill  1986), among the Asian 
economies, and between the two groups of economies.lg  It was argued in Helli- 
well and Chung (1992a) that the failure of  the same relationship to hold in 
Africa and Latin America might well be due to the relative lack of economic 
and financial openness in those economies. To the extent that this lack of open- 
ness led to slower importation of  technical progress from abroad or to the ex- 
tent that it was due to macroeconomic instabilities,20  then it may have contrib- 
18. The coefficient on the Bollen index is -.247,  with an absolute value of the t-statistic of 1.61 
19. These relationships are more formally estimated and tested in Helliwell and Chung (1992~). 
20. The link between macroeconomic instabilities and growth, with macroeconomic instability 
and high and variable inflation leading to low growth, has been emphasized by Fischer (1991) and 
Gylfason (1  990). 
in the 98-country equation reported in equation (2) of table 3 of Helliwell (1992a). 22  John F.  Helliwell 
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Fig. 1.10  International price indexes and real GDP per capita 1985: OECD and 
Asia 
Note:  See note for fig. I.  1. 
uted to the lower average growth in Latin America and Africa that appears 
even after allowance is made for differences in investment in human and physi- 
cal capital. These intercontinental comparisons, which lack any formal statisti- 
cal tests at this stage, tend to support the evidence from among the Asian econ- 
omies  that  more  openness tends  to  lead  to  faster  growth,  presumably  by 
permitting faster flows of ideas from countries where average productivity lev- 
els are higher. 
1.4  Conclusions 
The evidence in this paper has confirmed the general inapplicability to the 
Asian economies of the same convergence model that has fared rather well for 
the OECD countries and for several global samples. Growth is not higher in 
the poorer Asian countries, even after allowing for differences in rates of in- 
vestment in human and physical capital. Among the OECD countries, by con- 
trast, growth has been higher in those that were initially poorer, whether or 
not separate allowance is made for other variables influencing cross-country 
differences in growth rates, and whether the comparison is made using Solow 
residuals or growth rates of per capita GDP.21  As for the other variables used 
21. The convergence effect applicable to the industrial countries has been reported by Abramo- 
vitz  (1990), Baumol and Wolff  (1988). Dowrick  and Gemmell  (1991).  and Maddison  (1982) 
among others. Helliwell and Chung (1991a) show that convergence is applicable as much to the 
growth of  Solow residuals as to GDP per capita. Levine and Renelt (1992) show that even in 23  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
for the global samples of  countries, investment in  physical capital appears 
more important in Asia, and education less so. 
Growth is faster in those Asian countries that are more open to imports and 
capital movements. The evidence linking openness and growth for the sample 
of  Asian countries seems even stronger than for developing countries as  a 
whole (Harrison 1991), or for the OECD countries (Helliwell 1992b), although 
these differences remain to be tested. The relatively small number of  Asian 
countries, and the resulting importance of particular circumstances, may well 
make general conclusions on this score hard to reach. In any event, there is a 
clear grouping among the Asian economies under review, with the more open 
also the faster growing. There are so many other factors distinguishing the two 
groups of countries that it is clearly premature to make any strong conclusions 
at this point. 
There is also some evidence of  a trade-off between more democracy and 
faster growth for given levels of investment and openness. Whether or not the 
existence of an Asian trade-off between growth and democracy stands the test 
of more thorough investigation, such a trade-off relates more to the 1960-85 
period than to the next century, since the positive link between incomes and 
democracy is likely to combine with the high growth rates of most of these 
economies to put them all into the class of  experienced democracies by  the 
time another 25 years have passed.22  For the countries with lower per capita 
growth rates and higher population growth rates (Brander and Dowrick 1991), 
the trade-off, if  it is confirmed, may  well remain in place for some years to 
come. 
One final qualification is necessary. Easterly et al. (1992) and others have 
noted that there is substantial variance from one decade to the next in the rank- 
ing of growth rates across countries, while there is much more stability in the 
country characteristics, including the  openness measures, used  to  explain 
growth rate differences. This suggests that the cross-sectional parameter esti- 
mates might be unstable from one period to the next and have little predictive 
power for future growth. These risks need to be assessed carefully before at- 
taching too much importance to the correlations based on a particular period 
of previous growth. Nonetheless, the link between openness and growth that 
is apparent for the Asian countries over the 1960-85 period seems a promising 
candidate for further investigation. 
global samples such as those used by  Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (1991) there is a robust 
negative effect running from initial GDP per capita to subsequent growth rates, while noting much 
less stability in the estimated effects of policy variables, including especially fiscal policies but 
also some of the openness measures used in this paper. 
22. The strong positive linkage from the level of real GDP per capita to  democracy is docu- 
mented in Helliwell (1992a). Appendix A 
Table 1A.1 
Average Growth  Average Growth  Investment as a  Average Scale 
GDP per  GDP per  in Adult  Secondary School  in GDP  Percentage of  (billion 



























































































































































































































































































































‘As a percentage of adult population. 26  John F.  Helliwell 
Appendix B 
Table lB.l  Openness and Additional Educational Variables for Asia 
Black  Labor Force  Labor Force 
Market  Import  Nontariff  Adult  Education  Education 
Premium  Tariffs  Barriers  Literacy  EDP4  EDT 

































82.73  I 
0.00  14.3  17.3  2.40 
1.17  12.9  75.9  3.51 
9.49  8.2  57.1  1.90 
9.54  21.1  79.8  3.90 
13.45  63.6  19.3  8.00 
12.45  20.2  78.1  5.00 
1.33  14.2  19.1  1.20 
22.15  85.4  21.6  7.00 
33.70  87.4  34.2  5.30 
8.00  92.5  54.3  6.20 












Sources: EDP4 is a single observation for each country, based on survey data from Psacharopolous 
and Aniagada (1986). EDT uses UNESCO data on enrollment,  combined with birth and mortality 
statistics, as initially constructed by  Lau, Jamison, and Louat (1991) and subsequently revised by 
Louat (1991). 
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S71-SlO2. 
COEUlleIlt  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
John E Helliwell has analyzed a very interesting and fashionable issue, intema- 
tional growth linkages in the world economies. Estimating the augmented con- 
ditional convergence model, the paper first shows that the conditional conver- 
gence model failed to capture either the high rate of growth in Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Korea, or the low growth in India and Sri Lanka. The paper then 
raises the question of why growth in the Asian economies cannot be explained 
by  the conditional convergence model. This question is very  important be- 
Shin-ichi Fukuda is associate professor of  economics at the Institute of  Economic Research, 
Hitotsubashi University. 29  International Growth Linkages: Evidence from Asia and the OECD 
cause, in recent years, most East Asian countries accomplished remarkable 
growth,  while  Latin  American  and  African  countries  suffered  from  low 
growth rates. 
I have three comments. My first is on the link between openness and growth. 
One of the main results in this paper was that openness in East Asian econo- 
mies led to faster growth. In my view, this is especially true for Singapore and 
Hong Kong, where openness accelerated economic growth mainly because of 
their geographical advantage. For example, Hong Kong’s neighboring country 
is mainland China. Since the market of mainland China is closed, openness is 
very advantageous to Hong Kong. However, when we consider the link be- 
tween openness and growth for other Asian countries, I think that we need to 
be more careful. For example, in the case of Japan, it is usually said that the 
protection of domestic industry by the Ministry of International Trade and In- 
dustry (MITI) helped the success of such Japanese companies as Toyota. Simi- 
lar protection was also successful in Korea. Thus, in these countries, it may be 
true that some protectionism helped their economic growth. Of course, protec- 
tionism in these countries must  be  distinguished from the inward-oriented 
import-substitution policies sometimes adopted in Latin American countries. 
In fact, even under protectionism, the share of  exports in GDP was very sig- 
nificant to the economic development of Japan and Korea. However, I think 
that the Japanese and Korean experience teaches us that it is not always simple- 
minded openness that leads to successful economic growth. 
My second comment is on the role of exports on the demand side of eco- 
nomic development. In the paper, the role of  supply-side factors in economic 
development was stressed. Needless to say, the supply side is important. How- 
ever, in my view, demand externality or “the big push” was important for East 
Asian economic development. For the East Asian economies with small do- 
mestic markets, export is sometimes the big push and has demand spillover 
effects. For example, in the case of  Japan, it has been said that the special 
demand for exports during the Korean War was the big push for the Japanese 
economy. Before this special demand occurred, the Japanese economy was 
limited by  the small size of its market and the small purchasing power of its 
people. However, special demand was the big push in some industries and 
generated demand spillover for the products of other industries. 
My  final comment about the paper is on the sample period of  estimation 
adopted: 1960-85.  Although this sample period has been used in most previ- 
ous studies, it may be somewhat misleading when considering the economic 
development of East Asian countries. Most East Asian countries achieved re- 
markable economic development after 1985. For example, in Thailand, GNP 
in 1990 was more than twice the GNP in 1985, in terms of domestic currency. 
Even in Korea, which had already achieved high growth rates before  1985, 
GNP almost doubled from 1985 to 1990, if we measure it in dollars. Since the 
growth rate of GNP in most Latin American countries was very low after 1985, 
extending the sample period may change some of the results in the paper. 